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ABSTRACT 
As cyberspace matures, the international system faces a new 
challenge in confronting the use of force. Non-State actors continue 
to grow in importance, gaining the skill and the expertise necessary 
to wage asymmetric warfare using non-traditional weaponry that 
can create devastating real-world consequences. The international 
legal system must adapt to this battleground and provide workable 
mechanisms to hold aggressive actors accountable for their 
actions. The International Criminal Court—the only criminal 
tribunal in the world with global reach—holds significant promise 
in addressing this threat. The Assembly of State Parties should 
construct the definition of aggression to include these emerging 
challenges. By structuring the definition to confront the challenges 
of cyberspace—specifically non-State actors, the disaggregation of 
warfare, and new conceptions of territoriality—the International 
Criminal Court can become a viable framework of accountability 
for the wars of the twenty-first century. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Cyber warfare, a subset of a larger field known as information 
operations,2 until recently appeared to belong to the realm of science 
fiction. Although cyber attacks have occurred throughout most of the 
Internet’s history,3 States have just begun to include them in their doctrine 
                                                     
1 A.B. 2003, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2010, Duke University School 
of Law; former Electronic Warfare Officer, United States Air Force. A special 
thanks to Professor Noah Weisbord for all his assistance and patience. All views 
and opinions expressed in this iBrief are those of the author alone and do not 
reflect those of any other individual, the Department of Defense, the United 
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2 THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 29 (2000). 
3 Id. at 23. 
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and tactics.4 Cyber attacks do not fit neatly into the traditional international 
framework governing the use of force. Cyber attacks represent a new form 
of disaggregated warfare, substantially conducted by non-State collectives, 
that displays new conceptions of territoriality. These challenges require 
substantial adjustments of the international system. The Assembly of State 
Parties’ (ASP) on-going effort to define aggression presents a powerful 
opportunity to confront both of these issues simultaneously. The ASP 
should adapt its definition to better account for this emerging threat by 
including the aggressive acts of non-State collectives. That definition should 
be broadly interpreted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to include 
these new conceptions of territoriality and, most importantly, the new 
weapons of cyberspace. 
I. NOTABLE INSTANCES OF CYBER ATTACK – THE NEW 
BATTLEFIELD OF CYBERSPACE 
¶2 Just before midnight on August 8, 2008, Georgian military 
personnel moved into the semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia.5 
Georgia maintains its military action was purely responsive to Russian 
conduct.6 Georgia cites both steadily increasing attacks from separatist 
groups and alleged incursions by Russian troops into South Ossetian 
territory as justification for their subsequent armed response.7 Russia 
continues to claim that it acted only after Georgia made a brash attempt to 
reclaim its break-away providence.8 
¶3 The bombs and bullets flew simultaneously with packets and 
botnets. For the first time, a ground attack coincided with a cyber attack.9 
Georgian websites were bombarded by thousands of computers in what 
technology experts call a Distributed Denial of Service attack, or DDoS.10 
¶4 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can be accomplished with only one 
computer, and in a multitude of ways. The goal of a DoS attack is to prevent 
                                                     
4 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, 
at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html. 
5 GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA, CHRONOLOGY RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN GEORGIA 
13 (June 19, 2009), 
http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/en/doc/10010584/CHRONOLOGY%20MIA%2020
08.pdf. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Anne Barnard, Russians Push Past Separatist Region, Assaulting a City in 
Central Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, August 11, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/world/europe/11georgia.html. 
9 Markoff, supra note 4. 
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the intended individual users from utilizing a certain networked resource. A 
variety of techniques are available to exploit the underlying Internet 
communication architecture and prevent legitimate use of networks. Most 
DoS attacks flood the target network with bogus traffic or overwhelm a 
target computer with bogus requests preventing the legitimate use of either 
resource. 
¶5 DoS attacks evolved to DDoS attacks, which are much more 
debilitating and considerably more difficult to defend against. DDoS attacks 
use primarily the same tactics as a DoS attack but from multiple source 
computers. These computers are usually controlled remotely through 
vulnerabilities or previous malware infections. Vulnerability attacks exploit 
existing deficiencies in the operating software of a computer. These ‘bugs’ 
can be used to either disable the targeted computer, or in some instances can 
be used to cause the targeted computer to attack a second computer, without 
the knowledge of the targeted computer's owner.11 More commonly, DDoS 
attacks utilize malicious software (or malware). Malware refers to computer 
code specifically written with harmful intent. 
¶6 The false requests from a DDoS attack caused Georgian 
government websites to go offline.12 Internet service in Georgia slowed to a 
crawl as bogus requests clogged the limited data routes in and out of the 
country.13 Georgian government officials experienced extreme difficulty 
communicating with their citizens and the outside world.14 Hackers defaced 
Georgian websites with Russian nationalistic propaganda.15 Georgia blamed 
the Russian government, claiming it was the victims of State cyber 
warfare.16 Russia denied sponsoring or supporting any cyber attack on 
Georgia.17 Russian officials claimed the attacks were likely the result of 
overzealous individuals acting on nationalistic sentiment.18 
A new form of warfare 
¶7 When considering the impact of cyberspace on international law, it 
is important to note the differences between the variable levels of malicious 
cyber activity, which include cyber crime, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism, 
                                                     
11 See DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 234–37 
(1999) (explaining various tactics used to exploit existing weaknesses in server 
management software, specifically a UDP packet storm where target computers 
are used to disable each other). 
12 Markoff, supra note 4. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Markoff, supra note 4. 
18 Id. 
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cyber attacks, and cyber warfare.19 The intentions of the perpetrator and the 
effects of the act are one useful way to classify the malicious activity.20 
Cyber crime is activity conducted for profit, primarily motivated by 
financial gain or notoriety.21 Cyber crime typically involves the production 
of malware, the distribution of child pornography, hijacking for ransom, the 
sale of mercenary services, and the like.22 Cyber espionage is characterized 
by a motivation to discover sensitive information rather than that of causing 
harm.23 Cyber espionage can be conducted by an individual or a collective 
with the goal of pecuniary gain or strategic military advantage.24 Cyber 
terrorism, like all terrorism, is intended to influence an audience or motivate 
a government through threats and violence.25 Cyber terrorists use the 
malicious tools available in cyberspace as weapons against cyber and real 
world targets.26 
¶8 The definition of cyber attack remains inconsistent. Some 
commentators use the term to encompass a wide variety of acts of cyber 
terrorism and cyber warfare.27 Other commentators use cyber attacks as a 
separate category.28 Even among these experts, usage varies. Some argue 
that cyber warfare requires the simultaneous use of conventional 
weaponry.29 Others categorize cyber attacks by the identity and motivations 
of the attackers.30 Still others look to the type of targets and degree of harm 
caused by the attacks.31 No expert questions that Georgia was the victim of 
organized cyber attacks, but many experts scoff at the notion that the attacks 
amounted to cyber warfare.32 
¶9 One difficulty in the treatment of cyber attack in international law 
stems from the ease with which an attack can morph between levels, and the 
                                                     
19 Technology Quarterly-Cyber Warfare: Marching Off to Cyberwar, THE 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 71, available at 2008 WLNR 23421990 
[hereinafter ECONOMIST]. 
20 Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch - 
The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 301 (2008). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Solce, supra note 20. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 ECONOMIST, supra note 19. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Ethan Zuckerman, Misunderstanding Cyberwar in Georgia, REUTERS, Aug. 
16, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSGOR66065320080816. 
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difficulty in determining the level at the time of the attack. The steps used to 
gain access to a network for the purposes of espionage will be nearly 
identical to those used for access in wartime. While disguise and deception 
have been a part of warfare since ancient times, the ease and speed with 
which a cyber infiltrator can change roles coupled with the potential 
devastation from an attack on certain networks create a need for swift 
defensive actions. Due to these difficulties, a cautious network defense may 
treat lower level attacks and more serious attacks similarly. These 
challenges create a significant proportionality issue in self-defense 
decisions. 
¶10 While the cyber attacks launched to date may seem relatively tame 
when compared to the destruction capable of traditional instrumentalities of 
war, experts generally agree that potential cyber attacks of the very near 
future are likely to carry significantly greater consequences.33 The greater 
the network integration of a target country’s infrastructure, the greater its 
potential vulnerability.34 Georgia and Estonia suffered limited real world 
consequences from their attacks largely due to their limited reliance on 
cybernetic networks.35 In a country as reliant as the United States, 
hypothetical targets include the disabling of water purification systems,36 
the intentional misrouting of trains causing massive collisions,37 the 
disruption of air-traffic control,38 the intentional opening of dams,39 and 
                                                     
33 Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 894 (1999); Roger W. Barnett, A Different Kettle of Fish: 
Computer Network Attack, in 76 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER 
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 31–32 (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002). 
34 Id. 
35 ECONOMIST, supra note 19. It is important to note, however, that Georgia and 
Estonia were both more susceptible to DDoS attacks due to their relatively small 
internet accessibility. Internet traffic is designed to take the fastest route to its 
destination, not the geographically shortest. When a network has relatively few 
nodes through which to route packets of information, slowing or clogging them 
with a DDoS attack is relatively easy. Such a country-wide DDoS attack would 
be extremely challenging in the United States, as packets would automatically 
route around the slow nodes. So while increased reliance and interconnectivity 
can result in greater significance of attack, it also increases the difficulty of 
rendering wide-spread service outages through the DDoS methods used against 
Georgia. 
36 David Tubbs, et al., Technology and Law: The Evolution of Digital Warfare, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 7, 18. 
37 ECONOMIST, supra note 19. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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potentially the meltdown of nuclear reactors,40 all resulting in significant 
loss of life and property very much on par with damage caused by 
traditional weaponry.41 
¶11 Actual loss of life and destruction of property are possibilities of 
cyber attack, but the more likely and prevalent threat stems from malicious 
interference with communication networks and economic markets. A cyber 
attacker could manipulate the stock market or cause massive and sustained 
outages of wireless networks.42 While these acts lack the physical 
destruction of other attacks, the potential economic consequences and 
breadth of their impact make them a serious threat to the security of a State. 
When the greater likelihood of these attacks is combined with the 
possibility of sustained or repeated interference with these increasingly 
important aspects of our infrastructure, the threat seems quite ominous. 
However, even a State-sponsored manipulation of economic markets would 
fail to meet the traditional definition of international aggression.43 
Substantial Involvement of Non-State Actors 
¶12 The current State actor requirement in international law greatly 
limits its applicability to cyber attacks. Evidence certainly shows that a 
portion of the attacks on Georgia were carried out by individuals without 
direct affiliation to any group or State.44 Websites displayed how-to guides 
providing eager individuals step-by-step instructions on how to configure 
their computers to attack Georgian websites.45 Other websites coordinated 
the volunteers by posting the statuses of target sites.46 This information 
allowed individuals to redirect their computers from disabled targets to new 
targets.47 Yet these voluntary attacks gained momentum only after the initial 
                                                     
40 John F. Murphy, Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 33, at 323, 326.  
41 It should be noted these attacks would generally require significantly greater 
sophistication than that shown in the Russian-Georgian conflict. While the tools 
are certainly available and the defenses frequently porous enough, how 
widespread and how porous are issues of strenuous debate. 
42 Solce, supra note 20, at 310. 
43 See Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 1, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression], available 
at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?20+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int%27l+L.+1+p
df. 
44 ECONOMIST, supra note 19. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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wave of cyber attacks.48 Most importantly, they fail to explain the ‘staging 
attacks’, or trial runs, that occurred weeks prior to the ground war.49 
¶13 In July, independent non-profit monitoring groups noticed a 
significant number of malicious attacks on Georgian websites.50 These 
attacks were debilitating but brief, likely a dress rehearsal for the August 
attacks.51 Some of the very same websites attacked in July were attacked 
again in August after the conventional war began.52 The immediate 
coordination and the sophistication of the August attacks suggests strong 
organizational influence.53 Many have suggested responsibility for the 
attacks rests with a nefarious organization, the Russian Business Network 
(RBN).54 
¶14 The RBN thrives in the largely unregulated and wild-west 
atmosphere of Russian cyberspace.55 The RBN has a hand in some of the 
worst aspects of the Internet.56 Child pornography, malware, spam, identity 
theft, and offensive cyber attack capabilities are sold for profit by the 
RBN.57 Although the RBN has no headquarters, website, or legal status, 
their name appears on the registration of thousands of websites.58 
¶15 Independent companies are also available for hire to direct cyber 
attacks at ‘legitimate’ targets.59 Sony, Universal and other large copyright 
holders have hired such independent companies to initiate DDoS attacks 
against users of file sharing software suspected of sharing their copyrighted 
materials.60 However, these cyber-mercenaries are not overly discriminating 
in their target selection.61 One reason file sharing software remains legal is 
its ability to allow lower budget producers to share their work.62 In the past, 
                                                     
48 Markoff, supra note 4. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Markoff, supra note 4. 
54 Id. 
55 See Brian Krebs, Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as Conduit for Cybercrime, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2007, at A15, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/AR2007101202461.html. 
56 Markoff, supra note 4. 
57 Id. 
58 Krebs, supra note 55. 
59 David Gewirtz, Digital Defense: The Coming Cyberwar, 14 J. 
COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L 3 (2008). 
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mercenaries have mistakenly targeted these legitimate users.63 While their 
inadvertent attacks cause no tangible damage, the economic consequences 
can be dire.64 
¶16 Other independent companies have even engaged in repeated cyber 
attacks against each other. Competition between Internet service providers 
(ISPs) has led companies to orchestrate DDoS attacks on each others’ 
networks in an attempt to hurt their competitor’s quality of service.65 These 
non-State ‘legitimate’ international actors highlight the necessity of 
transnational cyber attack regulation. They also illustrate the substantial 
likelihood of actual cyber mercenaries who conduct cyber attacks on behalf 
of aggressive States. The international legal regime must consider these 
groups when drafting tools to punish aggressive acts. 
¶17 Other individuals face interesting dilemmas in the cyber frontier.66 
“Bug hunters” are private individuals who can make significant incomes 
discovering the flaws in commercially available programming.67 They then 
sell their discoveries to other interested parties.68 Some of the purchasers 
are the software writers themselves, others are security firms, and still 
others are motivated by the pure profit afforded by the secondary black 
market, or worse their own hacking and malware projects.69  
                                                     
¶18 This market for vulnerabilities remains completely unregulated.70 
Some individual bug hunters practice self-regulation by refusing to sell their 
discoveries to foreign interests.71 However, the bugs they sell provide keys 
to the doors through which cyber warfare can be waged.72 States are known 
purchasers of bug information, and their interest is likely to grow.73 As the 
cyber age expands into the area of warfare, international law must be 
equipped to regulate the broad diversity of actors who will play important 
roles in tomorrow’s aggressive wars. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Denning, supra note 11, at 236. 
66 Michael Reilly, How Long Before All-out Cyberwar?, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 
23, 2008, at 24, available at 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19726446.100-how-long-before-allout-
cyberwar.html. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Reilly, supra note 66.  
73 Id. 
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The Disaggregation of Warfare 
¶19 International law is ill-equipped to adjust to the disaggregation of 
warfare made possible by the cyber age. Combatants and assets need not 
physically gather together to conduct their attack. Each asset is capable of 
contributing to the collective effort despite physical distance. This is 
achieved through the global reach of the Internet, and the homogeneity of 
the software running on the computers that it connects. A bug hunter only 
gains importance though the remarkable similarities in software design and 
use around the globe. These similarities create the global market for 
discovered security flaws, and those flaws are fundamental tools in the 
writing of malware. 
¶20 Some malware allows targeted computers to be ‘slaved’ to the 
commands of a single operator who can remotely control aspects of their 
behavior. These ‘slave’ computers are commonly known as ‘botnets.’ 
Botnets can be instructed to carry out activities of the same character as a 
DoS attack. However, by their coordinated efforts, these botnets are able to 
achieve greater devastation than possible from a single machine.74 DDoS 
attacks are capable of creating significant effects on entire networks without 
specifically targeting every computer on the target network. 
¶21 The Internet's architecture and homogeneity permits remote, largely 
anonymous world-wide access, thereby allowing the triggering of botnet 
attacks from any computer with internet connectivity. These same 
characteristics also allow the assembly and use of cyber weaponry on a 
global scale. For example, the RBN controls multiple world-wide botnets, 
capable of being used for DDoS attacks similar to those used against 
Georgia.75 Infected computers scattered across the globe reportedly can be 
rented for four cents a machine, providing the equipment needed for a 
                                                     
74 It is important to note that botnets are useful in activities other than DDoS 
attacks. Botnets can be used for other malicious purposes, including spam. For 
those fortunate enough to not know, spam is the electronic equivalent of junk 
mail. Spam messages are unsolicited e-mail, generally advertising products or 
websites. Botnets are used to hide the source of spam so as to avoid the rather 
extensive filters in use by most e-mail providers, and can be used to execute e-
mail floods or bombs. 
A form of volunteer botnet has become greatly popular to assist in the 
examination of scientific data. Called distributive computing, users install 
software on their computer that allows its hardware to be used to examine data 
from various scientific experiments. This distributive computing provides a 
source of free computing power normally requiring extremely expensive 
supercomputers. For an example, see Gewirtz, supra note 59 (discussing 
Folding@home, which uses distributive computing to conduct studies of protein 
folding and molecular dynamics). 
75 Krebs, supra note 55. 
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DDoS attack to any paying party for use against any desired target.76 
Alternatively, the RBN could have donated its services in the spirit of 
nationalistic motivations. Such an unsolicited donation may explain the 
cyber attacks suffered by Georgia. Botnets allow a cyber attacker to 
implement a coordinated attack from numerous locations, including within 
the target network, with very limited warning for a nominal cost. These 
types of cyber attacks defy the simple categorization of traditional 
weaponry currently used in international law. 
¶22 The cyber attacks on Georgia were not the first instance of 
coordinated attacks directed at a former Soviet State.77 Estonia suffered 
similar DDoS attacks in 2007.78 Those attacks began following the Estonian 
government’s decision to relocate Soviet era monuments.79 The attacks 
targeted government websites and several Estonian banks.80 
Communication with Estonian emergency services was briefly 
interrupted.81 The Estonian government blamed the Russian government.82 
The Russian government denied any involvement.83 An investigation by 
Estonian authorities resulted in charges against an ethnic Russian living in 
Estonia for his limited role in the cyber attacks.84 However, the 
investigation still continues, and many observers suspect RBN—if not 
Russian intelligence agency—involvement.85 
                                                     
¶23 In general, while tracing an attack is possible, most traces terminate 
at the ISP. An ISP subscriber may be the responsible party, or the ISP may 
be yet another conduit through which the attack has been routed. 
Regardless, further tracing will require ISP cooperation.86 Estonia’s 
76 Id. 
77 Mark Lander & John Markoff, First war in cyberspace: The lessons of 
Estonia, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 29, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 
10334241. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 ECONOMIST, supra note 19. 
82 RUSSIAN LIFE, supra note 77. 
83 Id. 
84 Thomas Claburn, Estonian Hacker Fined for Cyberattack, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=20
5918839. 
85 Id. 
86 Murphy, supra note 40, at 327. For an interesting discussion of ‘rogue’ ISPs 
and the difficulty in having their connectivity to the internet severed, see Brian 
Krebs, A Closer Look at McColo, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2008, available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/11/the_badness_that_was_m
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difficulties in tracing and prosecution are emblematic of the inherent 
investigative difficulties caused by the disaggregation of cyber warfare. The 
number and diversity of culpable individuals involved in international cyber 
aggression requires an appropriately tailored and flexible definition of 
aggression. 
New Conceptions of Territoriality 
¶24 Cyberspace challenges a fundamental aspect of international law—
territory. This is best exemplified by the inherent structure of the Internet 
when applied to a DDoS attack utilizing a botnet. Botnets are not limited 
geographically; the malware that creates them moves freely across national 
borders. A DDoS attack using a botnet will cause assets scattered across the 
globe to attack a target through the Internet. Internet traffic was specifically 
designed to travel over the fastest route possible.87 This route is not 
necessarily the same as the most geographically direct route. 
¶25 Information sent over the Internet is divided into packets. These 
packets adapt their routes to network congestion, moving through nodes that 
result in the fastest communication. Not every packet in a message will take 
the same route, as system dynamics change during transmission. After the 
packets arrive, often at different times, the target computer reassembles 
them to recreate the message. The result of such a system creates complex, 
often circuitous routing across substantially more international borders than 
traditional instrumentalities of warfare.88 The routing and tracing difficulties 
create significant challenges for the active defense against attacks and also 
the law regulating the use of force.89 
¶26 Cyber attacks are not limited to Russia and its former satellite 
States.90 The United States has suffered multiple attacks, allegedly of 
Chinese origin.91 These attacks, code named ‘Titan Rain,’ nearly disrupted 
power on the West Coast and resulted in multiple security breaches at 
defense contracting companies.92 Another suspected Chinese attack 
                                                                                                                       
ccolo.html (discussing the termination of McColo, a suspected ISP for the RBN 
which, when disabled, resulted in the significant reduction of worldwide spam). 
87 Tubbs, et al, supra note 36, at 10. 
88 Id. 
89 Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force under Article 
2(4), in INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 73, 79. 
90 Carolyn Duffy Marsan, How close is World War 3.0?, NETWORK WORLD, 
Aug. 22, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/082207-cyberwar.html. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 2. 
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purportedly disrupted power to fifty million people in North America.93 
These attacks are generally considered probing attacks, designed to test 
American countermeasures.94 Britain also has reported cyber attacks from 
both State-sponsored and terrorist sources, referring to them as 
“remarkable” in number.95 
¶27 Not all attacks fit neatly into this traditional attacker/attacked State 
framework. At the height of the cyber attacks against Georgian websites 
during the Russia-Georgia conflict, many besieged websites were 
temporarily moved to servers located in the United States.96 The attacks 
continued but the new hosts were better able to defend against them.97 
While the attacked server was located in the United States, the ‘territory’ in 
cyberspace being interfered with was that of Georgia. 
¶28 Smaller groups and individuals are increasingly capable of cheaply 
and efficiently creating significant damage in cyberspace that results in real 
world consequences.98 Attacks are difficult to trace and current legal 
structures make prosecution extremely unlikely.99 As greater reliance on 
computer networks expands throughout the globe, the potential destruction 
resulting from these attacks will increase.100 So, too, will the number of 
attacks, unless this increase in potential impact is not counterbalanced with 
an increase in risk to the future perpetrators.101 
¶29 The international community must recognize this emerging 
challenge and structure an international response accordingly. Aggression in 
cyberspace requires an international solution. Cyber attacks lack the 
traditional geospatial limitations of traditional aggression. The Internet’s 
structure permits attacks to occur from any part of the globe against any 
target with no early warning or indication. International attempts to regulate 
                                                     
93 Gewirtz, supra note 59. 
94 Marsan, supra note 90. 
95 Jonathan Richards, Thousands of Cyber Attacks Each Day on Key Utilities, 
TIMES (U.K.), August 23, 2008, at 9, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4592677.ece. 
96 Ed Sutherland, Georgian president relocates website to Atlanta, ALL 
HEADLINE NEWS, August 11, 2008, 
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7011905889.  
97 Id. 
98 Barnett, supra note 33, at 26–27. 
99 See Claburn, supra note 84. 
100 See Tubbs et al, supra note 36, at 19; Phillip A. Johnson, Is It Time for a 
Treaty on Information Warfare, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER 
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 439, 441. 
101 See Arthur K. Cebrowski, CNE and CNA in the Network-Centric Battlespace, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 4. 
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cyber attacks must create individual accountability for the malfeasance of 
State and non-State actors. The crime of aggression and the ICC provide a 
unique opportunity and appropriate method for tackling this important 
issue. 
II. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER ATTACKS: 
THE EMERGING DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
¶30 Contemporary international law prohibits the use of force between 
States except with UN Security Council authorization or in self-defense.102 
A 1974 General Assembly (GA) Resolution interprets these restrictions 
with more specificity.103 The Resolution (1) limits aggression to the use of 
traditional armed force, (2) is highly State centric, (3) uses examples of 
traditional aggregated warfare, and (4) relies on traditional concepts of 
territorial integrity.104 
¶31 The 1974 GA Resolution is the basis for the emerging definition of 
the crime of aggression in international criminal law, the front in the larger 
international law debate over the difference between legal and illegal uses 
of force.105 The 1974 GA Resolution served as the foundation in the 
negotiations to determine which acts of political and military leaders qualify 
as aggression.106 As the definition of the international crime of aggression 
borrows heavily from the 1974 GA Resolution defining an act of 
aggression, the proposed language has many of the same characteristics.107  
¶32 The latest SWGCA definition is made up of two core concepts: the 
State act of aggression and the link between the individual and the State 
act.108 The definition of the act of aggression, like the 1974 GA Resolution, 
limits its applicability to traditional weaponry of warfare, focuses on acts 
committed by and against States, uses aggregated examples of aggression, 
and embodies traditional conceptions of territoriality. The link between the 
individual and the State act is achieved through four components: the 
leadership clause, conduct verbs, a liability doctrine, and modes of 
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perpetration/participation.109 Each choice made by the SWGCA has 
significant implications for the definition of the crime of aggression when 
applied to cyber warfare. The 1974 GA Resolution and the SWGCA 
definition will be examined in relation to the challenges raised by cyber 
warfare. 
A new form of warfare 
¶33 The GA Resolution explicitly applies to the traditional instrument 
of armed force and the traditional weaponry used in armed attacks.110 
Article 3 of the Resolution provides examples of aggression, referring to the 
attack, invasion, bombardment and blockade of a State by the traditional 
armed forces—land, air, sea, or marine—of another State.111 While the 
Resolution carefully emphasizes that the examples are not exhaustive, 
power for constituting other acts as aggressive lies solely with the Security 
Counsel.112 Indirect force is limited to acts which are sufficiently similar in 
severity and tactics to be analogous to those of conventional armed 
forces.113 Even blockades are only considered aggressive when instituted by 
the armed forces of another State.114 
¶34 Armed force was not the only form of force considered by the 
negotiating States. The 1967 and 1973 Oil Embargoes created significant 
support for the inclusion of economic aggression in the GA Resolution.115 
The Resolution was purposefully drafted to appease these interests through 
the inclusion of Article 4, which underscored the exemplary nature of the 
list.116 In doing so, the Resolution neither endorsed nor precluded the 
finding that aggression could take the form of an unarmed act.117 
¶35 While making a reference to the GA Resolution, the SWGCA 
included in their proposed definition the Resolution’s list of acts from 
Article 3 that would qualify as aggression.118 However, they eliminated 
Article 4, instead agreeing on language that allows for interpretation of the 
list as either open or closed.119 By adopting the explicit reliance on 
traditional instrumentalities and weaponry of Article 3 and eliminating the 
caveat of Article 4, the SWGCA has severely restricted the application of 
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their definition to cyber warfare. Yet cyber warfare certainly has the 
potential to create catastrophic damage well beyond that resulting from a 
threshold traditional weapons attack. The interpretation of the list as open 
could conceivably include cyber attacks resulting in physical damages, but 
may not include the significant threat of non-lethal communication and 
economic disruption through cyber tactics.  
¶36 The SWGCA definition also includes a de minimus clause, by 
limiting the definition to acts which, “by [their] character, gravity and scale, 
constitute[] manifest violation[s] of the Charter of the United Nations.”120 
The de minimus clause provides an important qualifier for the regulation of 
cyber attacks under the definition. Many cyber attacks do not rise to the 
level of activity to warrant involvement by the ICC.121 The de minimus 
clause makes clear only manifest violations of the UN Charter would trigger 
culpability under the statute. 
¶37 As discussed below, the leadership clause of the SWGCA definition 
contains language that could be strictly interpreted to limit its applicability 
to cyber warfare. The conduct verbs provide for a broad level of culpable 
activity including planning, preparation, initiation and execution, all of 
which are broad enough to include cyber attacks. However, these conduct 
verbs have unique implications in the cyber context. The cyber tactic of 
creating a ‘trapdoor’ in a networked system for easy future access may be a 
preparatory step for aggression. Yet that very same trapdoor may only be 
used for cyber-espionage, a legal activity.122 This duplicitous use creates 
difficulty in attributing culpability through the use of the conduct verbs 
alone, and creates the necessity for a liability doctrine in the crime of 
aggression. 
¶38 The SWGCA has multiple liability doctrines to choose from, 
including the common law tradition of conspiracy, the doctrines of superior 
responsibility, organizational guilt, or joint criminal enterprise (JCE).123 The 
likely doctrine of choice appears to be JCE.124 JCE has gained significantly 
in importance since its adoption by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, and was recently incorporated into the Rome 
Statute.125  
                                                     
120 Id. 
121 Schmitt, supra note 33 at 897. 
122 For a discussion of espionage, customary international law, and cyberspace, 
see Anthony D’Amato, International Law, Cybernetics, and Cyberspace, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 59, 67–68. 
123 See Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, supra note 43, at 54. 
124 Id. at 58–59. 
125 Id. 
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 3 
 
¶39 JCE eliminates the reliance on a formal chain of command found in 
the doctrine of superior responsibility, instead requiring participation in the 
criminal enterprise.126 This aspect of JCE creates significant benefits in the 
cyber context. Few, if any, cyber attacks occur in organizations with a 
formalized chain of command. Instead, multiple members of an 
organization like the RBN create a cyber attack capability which is 
implemented on the decision of potentially different members. The system 
lacks a true hierarchy of decision making. JCE allows broad connections of 
culpability in these fluid organizations. 
¶40 However, this breadth also creates significant problems. Unlike the 
concept of conspiracy, JCE does not require explicit agreement on a 
common plan.127 Instead, the Court relies on the participants’ “common 
purpose” to connect them to the Collective/State act.128 This common 
purpose test creates difficulty in application to certain cyber tactics, as the 
breadth of the common purpose is determined in hindsight by the Court. 
The ease with which a cyber attacker can morph between various levels and 
forms of attack will undoubtedly create issues related to intent when 
determining the breadth of a JCE. 
Substantial Involvement of Non-State Actors 
¶41 The 1974 GA Resolution is limited in scope to acts committed by 
State actors.129 Subsequent articles repeatedly include the limiting phrases 
“by a State” and “of a State.”130 While the definition includes indirect uses 
of force, asymmetric conflict131 is only included if conducted by or on 
behalf of a State.132 Article 7 makes clear the Resolutions’ inapplicability to 
certain independence movements without recognized Statehood.133 
¶42 The SWGCA drafters included Article 1 of the Resolution nearly 
verbatim in their definition of the specific act of aggression.134 As discussed 
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above, the SWGCA included all Article 3 examples in the proposed 
definition. Although the drafters retained the language from Article 1 of the 
GA Resolution that refers to ‘manifest violations’ of the UN Charter, the 
SWGCA proposed definition replaces the GA Resolution’s clear qualifier 
that the list is not exhaustive with the ambiguous phrase “any of the 
following acts.”135 
¶43 This change emerged as a balance between competing negotiating 
positions in the SWGCA over the issue of whether the list should be open 
or closed.136 The language was chosen to establish the necessary principle 
of legality, while not precluding a reading of the list as open.137 The final 
phrasing was the result of political negotiations, with the final interpretation 
to be left to the judges. The definition can and should be read as indicating 
the list is merely illustrative of actions currently accepted as aggression 
under customary international law.138 
¶44 The links between the State/Collective act and the individual 
contain similar limitations as the definition of the State act. While the 
conduct verbs provide for a rather broad level of culpable activity including 
planning, preparation, initiation and execution,139 its applicability is 
severely limited by the leadership clause. 
                                                     
¶45 The leadership clause is intended by the SWGCA to limit the 
applicability of the international crime of aggression to leaders and to 
exclude followers.140 The definition specifically limits its application to 
“persons in a position effectively to exercise control or to direct the political 
or military action of a State.”141 The leadership clause also limits culpable 
conduct to those with direct control over political or military action of the 
State.142 
¶46 The leadership clause provides significant limitations on the 
regulation of cyber attacks. The vast majority of cyber attacks are conducted 
by individuals with only tenuous affiliations to a collective.143 Most of these 
attacks are conducted by individuals for either pecuniary gain or 
135 Compare 1974 Resolution, supra note 103, art. 4, with SWGCA 2009 Report, 
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notoriety.144 The remaining attacks are conducted by loosely affiliated 
groups of people who lack any meaningful association.145 Only the 
occasional attack is even suspected to be sponsored by or conducted by a 
State.146 However, the number of suspected State sponsored cyber attacks 
continue to grow.147 As States begin to weaponize cyberspace while 
independent entities continue to offer cyber attack services to the highest 
bidder, serious international aggression will occur in cyberspace. 
Nevertheless, significant cyber attacks are more likely to be carried out by 
groups unaffiliated with particular States.148 
¶47 Most hackers lack any ability to exercise direct control over another 
individual, and certainly not a collective entity. No hacker is the leader of a 
State. However, a hacker may be able to gain “effective control” of 
significant State assets. If the word “position” in the leadership clause is 
interpreted broadly, an individual hacker who launched a barrage of 
missiles or issued bogus orders for an invasion could fit within the 
leadership clause. The clause becomes more cumbersome when applied to 
more plausible scenarios. The opening of dams and rerouting of trains by a 
hacker would meet the “effective control” standard, but could easily be 
construed as outside the “political or military action” constraint. DDoS 
attacks, conducted by either individuals or collective actors, are also 
difficult to fit into the leadership clause. 
¶48 However, some DDoS attacks may be viewed as meeting the 
restrictions of the leadership clause. A DDoS attack can control the military 
or political actions of a victim State by preventing the legitimate military 
and political leaders from exercising their control. The act of disrupting 
control itself is a form of control, through the maintenance of a status quo 
and the inability of the target State to react. Such a situation occurred in the 
Russia-Georgia conflict: the DDoS attacks prevented the Georgian 
government from effectively communicating with their own people and the 
outside world.149 The party or parties responsible for the DDoS attacks 
“effectively control[led]” significant political actions of the State by 
crippling the State’s ability to act. Had the DDoS attack also prevented the 
Georgian armed forces from coordinating an armed response, the State 
would have effectively lost control of its own military. 
¶49 While some cyber attacks could be viewed as meeting the 
leadership clause, most are hampered by the requirement of State action. 
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Elimination of ICC jurisdiction over individuals and non-State actors for the 
crime of aggression leaves significant and more likely cyber attacks outside 
the scope of international regulation. At a minimum, State leaders 
authorizing cyber attacks should be held accountable when their actions 
create significant international repercussions. 
The Disaggregation of Warfare 
¶50 The SWGCA definition of the act of aggression, through borrowing 
heavily from the 1974 GA Resolution, continues the traditional emphasis on 
classic, aggregated warfare. The definition uses the movement of armies, 
the blockade by navies, and the sending of armed groups as examples of 
aggressive acts.150 Allowing an attack by a State to originate from its 
sovereign territory is also considered an act of aggression.151  
¶51 Cyber warfare, on the other hand, represents a disaggregation of 
combatants. The inherent nature of many cyber tactics requires significant 
geographic dispersal of assets. The identity and location of attackers are 
masked, creating substantial difficulty in determining the identity or 
location of the attackers. The potential liability by a State for allowing its 
territory to be used for the origination of an aggressive act creates 
interesting questions in the context of cyber warfare. Botnets are created 
and used across geographic borders, resulting in multiple States hosting the 
aggressive forces. Inadvertent hosting of assets used in cyber aggression 
would certainly not lead to liability. However, a duty might be construed 
against a State to assist in ending the aggression. Because Paragraph 2 (f) 
specifically includes allowing territory to be used in an aggressive attack, 
States who knowingly allow aggressive action to originate within their 
jurisdiction could be considered aggressors under the SWGCA proposed 
definition.152 Paragraph 2(g) expands this to include allowing territory to be 
used by armed bands that launch attacks on another country.153 Without 
significant interpretative expansion, the definition can be read to include a 
State who knowingly allows aggressive attacks to continually originate 
from botnets within its territory. 
¶52 The international community must also determine the appropriate 
method for dealing with the modern weapons suppliers and mercenaries of 
the Internet. The development of malicious software and the sale of 
vulnerability information has become a global enterprise. Individuals who 
develop malicious software or sell software bugs to the highest bidder must 
also be held accountable. Without their assistance, large scale aggressive 
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cyber attacks would be impossible. The SWGCA definition would treat 
these industrialists of the cyber age similarly to how prosecutors at 
Nuremburg treated the leaders of German industry. 
¶53 The prosecutors at Nuremburg pursued charges against the financial 
and industrial leaders in Nazi Germany. Labeled the “economic case,” the 
prosecutors viewed these leaders as sharing culpability for the war.154 
Industrialists and financers gave Hitler the necessary means to rearm 
Germany with full knowledge of his goal to expand German borders.155 
Although the “economic case” resulted in acquittals for all but one 
defendant,156 the precedent is an important one. By allowing trials to 
proceed, the Nuremburg tribunal explicitly recognized the prima facie case 
of individual accountability for aggression outside of the traditional State 
structure.  
¶54 As the emerging cyber battlefield gains importance, the individuals 
with roles most similar to the Nuremburg economic defendants will not be 
the manufacturers of the computers, but the bug hunters and the leaders of 
the RBN. However, under the SWGCA’s definition, these individuals are 
only included when their acts interface with State-sponsored cyber 
aggression. Their actions would be viewed as impertinent to the 
international system should they sell cyber assets or develop malicious 
programming solely for non-State actors. 
¶55 The likely choice by the SWGCA to include JCE as the standard for 
liability in the crime of aggression eliminates many of the issues associated 
with the disaggregation of warfare. By removing the common-law 
conspiracy requirement for agreement to achieve a collective purpose, the 
significant contributors to cyber weaponry can be held liable for their acts. 
The leaders of organizations who commit criminal acts that have a 
foreseeable consequence of aiding cyber aggression would be considered 
part of the JCE. 
New Conceptions of Territoriality 
¶56 The SWGCA definition makes frequent reference to territory.157 
Paragraph 1 limits the definition of aggression to acts directed at the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State.158 The examples described in paragraph 2 rely heavily on territory, 
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using the term seven times.159 For example, the paragraph refers to the 
invasion or attack of territory, the annexation of territory, and the 
bombardment of territory. Blockades are limited to ports and coasts.160  
¶57 The frequent references to territory continue the traditionalistic 
trend of the SWGCA definition. Cyber attacks will rarely conform to 
historic conceptions of territory. Attacks can be triggered from any location 
with Internet access. Botnets can easily be transcontinental. The 
consequences of suspected Chinese disruption of North American power 
grids affected both Americans and Canadians.161 The origins, staging, 
targets, and consequences for these attacks will not be contained neatly 
within the borders drawn on a map. 
¶58 The leadership clause, conduct verbs, and use of JCE contain no 
explicit limitations to traditional notions of territoriality. Judges should 
refrain from transposing the territorial references of the second paragraph’s 
definition of aggressive acts to the first paragraph’s definition of the crime 
of aggression. The abilities of leaders to orchestrate aggressive acts outside 
the limitations of traditional territoriality extend beyond cyber warfare. An 
exiled leader who orchestrates an aggressive act with conventional 
weaponry should face the same consequences as a sitting leader who gives 
orders from his capital city. 
¶59 Both territorial issues and the structure of the Internet create 
significant challenges for the application of the Rome Statute’s 
jurisdictional trigger to cyber attacks. Generally speaking, the ICC will 
invoke jurisdiction when a signatory party is either the aggressor or victim 
of an act that meets the definition.162 Article 12 of the Rome Statute creates 
jurisdiction when the conduct occurs in or is committed by a national of a 
signatory State.163 It also includes the vessels and aircraft of the signatory 
States.164 The SWGCA has generally agreed that Article 12 includes both 
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the territory of the conduct and the consequence, ensuring liability for 
missile attacks and other remote strike capabilities.165 
¶60 While these clarifying remarks provide sufficient jurisdictional 
guidance for traditional weaponry, the question is greatly complicated by 
the internet’s structure. The natural flow of information on the internet 
creates unpredictable routing through various jurisdictions. A cyber attack 
will nearly certainly be routed through a large number of territories. The 
Court must determine whether such routing creates sufficient “conduct” to 
create jurisdiction of the court. Further, the relocation of Georgian websites 
to the United States creates another example of jurisdictional difficulty. The 
cyber attacks that occurred after the move attacked not Georgia’s, but an 
American company’s equipment. The crime of aggression in cyberspace 
creates the question of whether the territory should be virtual, actual, or 
both. 
III. PRESCRIPTIONS, PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE 
ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES AT THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE 
A new form of warfare 
¶61 To sufficiently counter the emerging challenges of cyber attacks, 
the ASP must adopt a framework that can be interpreted as inclusive of non-
traditional attacks by non-traditional actors. This framework will likely 
require a normative shift, focusing on the consequences of collective acts 
rather than the instrumentalities used in their execution. 
¶62 Professor Michael Schmitt, in a 1999 article, examined the use of 
force framework established by the UN Charter in light of the then-recent 
emergence of computer network attacks.166 According to Schmitt, the UN 
Charter drafters truly wished to regulate consequences of State action.167 
Yet the necessity to articulate workable normative standards required them 
to instead pursue restrictions on instrumentalities.168 Instrumentalities 
include the use of military, economic, and diplomatic force.169 By 
regulating instrumentalities, the drafters sought indirectly to regulate the 
consequences of their use.170 However, cyber attacks no longer fit neatly 
into these preexisting divisions. Rather, the diversity of potential cyber 
attacks spans the range of consequences. As cyber attacks no longer fit 
neatly into the preexisting divisions of instrumentalities, Schmitt argues that 
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the best approach is to shift the normative framework by deconstructing 
those instrumentalities back to their original “community values.”171 These 
values can then be used as shorthand to determine the legality of various 
levels of cyber at 172tack.   
                                                     
¶63 A normative framework shift is vital to international law’s 
adaptation to cyber warfare. Without it, the current prohibitions on force 
lack sufficient breadth to adequately address the many forms of cyber 
attack. However, Schmitt's proposal suffers from a significant flaw—the 
process of applying consequences inherently requires waiting for the actions 
to occur. While the proposal may be sufficient to cast judgment on past 
action, the process raises serious and important questions regarding the 
Rome Statutes principle of legality. Even to the attacker the consequences 
of a cyber attack may be unknown at the time the attack is triggered. More 
importantly, cyber tactics have shown a disturbing flexibility in swiftly 
shifting between legal and illegal international acts. A State faced with 
potential cyber aggression cannot wait for the consequences of the 
aggressive act when determining the appropriate reaction.  
¶64 Analogizing cyber tactics to those of traditionally recognized 
aggressive acts would be an alternative to Schmitt’s proposal. For example, 
a DDoS attack that disabled electronic commerce could be analogized to a 
blockade of a port. However, the analogy approach would violate the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege codified in Article 22 of the Rome 
Statute.173 Article 22 requires the definition of a crime be strictly construed 
and not extended by analogy.174 Further, while the analogy approach would 
include cyber attacks that cause physical damage similar to traditional 
attacks, analogy would fail to include the more likely attacks that merely 
cause costly and significant disruption of economic and communications 
systems. 
¶65 Broad interpretation of the term “armed” is a second alternative.175 
By including non-traditional armaments in the term, the definition broadens 
significantly without any further revision.176 The de minimus clause serves 
as a protection against over inclusion.177 Article 22 of the Rome Statute 
would not prevent this expansion, as the broad interpretation of “armed” is 
not accomplished through analogy.178 Both of these alternatives fail to 
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address the greatest flaw in Schmitt’s proposal—the flexibility of cyber 
tactics. States faced with a decision of how to respond to a cyber attack that 
could quickly morph into a clearly aggressive act lack guidance on the 
appropriate response. Further guidance on this issue will likely need to 
come from another international body. 
¶66 Key to any such solution is the interpretation of the SWGCA 
definition as containing an ‘open’ exemplary list of aggressive acts. A 
normative shift provides a base for constraining the use of cyber attacks in 
modern warfare, but the shift alone is insufficient to deal with the increased 
individuality of cyberspace. Presumably, Schmitt would continue to use the 
traditional concept of State actor in determining the applicability of 
international restrictions. 
Substantial Involvement of Non-State Actors 
¶67 The ongoing SWGCA attempt to define the crime of aggression 
provides an excellent opportunity to not only shift the normative framework 
for the conceptualizing use of force, but also provide for individual 
accountability on a global scale. The ASP should embrace the concept of 
individual responsibility for the actions of non-State actors and reject the 
artificial limitation to State actions. Combining this alteration with an 
articulation of a consequence-based normative framework will greatly 
enable the international community to adapt the crime of aggression to 
some of the greatest challenges threatening world peace and stability. 
¶68 Davis Brown considered—and ultimately rejected—the use of the 
ICC to combat the growing threat of cyber warfare.179 In dismissing the 
ICC, Brown cited the inflexibility of Article 22 of the Rome Statute.180 
Since Article 8 of the Rome Statute contains an extensive list of specific 
acts considered ‘war crimes,’ those occurring in cyberspace would not be 
included in the court’s jurisdiction. Instead of the ICC, Brown argued any 
new convention should refer disputes to the ICJ181 More states are likely to 
sign such a convention as it bypasses resistance to the ICC from key 
players, such as China and the United States.182 
¶69 Brown’s criticism of the ICC fails to consider two important 
issues.183 The first is the ability of the ICC to mold the crime of aggression 
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to include this very real and very likely future battlefield.184 Brown’s 
criticism of the inflexibility of the Rome Statute and its principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege may prove accurate for war crimes. However, by drafting a 
definition that includes aggressive acts in cyberspace, the ASP can bypass 
Brown’s critique of the current Statute. The definition of the crime of 
aggression represents an important opportunity to provide the statute much 
needed relevance throughout the twenty-first century. 
¶70 Secondly, Brown’s suggestion of referring disputes to the ICJ 
eliminates the ability of the international community to hold individuals 
accountable for their aggressive acts. Brown admits that the ICJ lacks the 
power to directly regulate individual behavior, but prefers the ICJ as a 
means of bringing as many countries into his proposed convention as 
possible.185 While such an effort at compromise is admirable, it ignores the 
greatest issue with regulating cyber warfare: the ease with which non-State 
collectives can engage in devastating asymmetric warfare with low costs 
and high levels of anonymity.186 
¶71 Brown’s overall recommendation of developing a Law of Armed 
Conflict for cyberspace remains a popular one.187 While the applicability of 
certain aspects of jus in bello provide unique challenges and likely will 
require significant amendment or addition, such efforts fail to deal with the 
larger problem of jus ad bellum that provide a greater risk to the 
international community. The ASP’s task of drafting a definition of 
aggression provides the necessary opportunity to both update the jus ad 
bellum for the new battlefield while simultaneously creating individual 
responsibility for those acts. 
¶72 The ASP should consider expanding the crime of aggression to 
include actions by non-State actors, as they have done with other 
international crimes. The realities of cyberspace greatly increase the ability 
of non-State groups to regularly and devastatingly function as aggressive 
actors in the international system. The ASP should provide the ICC with the 
capability of prosecuting all individuals responsible for the aggressive acts 
of collectives. 
The Disaggregation of Warfare 
¶73 The disaggregation of warfare in cyberspace alone provides limited 
challenges for the SWGCA definition. The SWGCA decision to include 
expansive conduct verbs and both effective and direct forms of leadership, 
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combined with the presumed use of a JCE standard allow the definition to 
apply equally to all leaders of an aggressive cyber act. The difficulties from 
the disaggregation of warfare derive from the interplay of disaggregation 
with the other characteristics of cyber attacks. Disaggregation is the factor 
that underscores the importance of moving past a State-centric definition 
that includes simplistic concepts of territoriality, and reliance on outdated 
examples of aggressive action. Disaggregation is the factor that requires a 
reexamination of these other aspects of the definition. Disaggregation 
requires the leadership clause and conduct verbs be interpreted broadly, in a 
manner consistent to effectuate other adjustments in the definition of the 
crime of aggression. 
New Conceptions of Territoriality 
¶74 Cyberspace and its new territoriality create largely conceptual 
rather than practical requirements for the definition of aggression. The 
definition should shift significantly from that of the 1974 GA Resolution 
and reject the archaic rigidity of territoriality. The prosecutors and judges of 
the ICC will be faced with difficult jurisdictional questions stemming from 
the evolving conceptions of territory and cyberspace. The breadth of ICC 
jurisdiction can be greatly increased if the physical routing of attacks is 
considered when determining whether a State party to the Rome Statute was 
attacked. Including both the State victim in cyberspace and the State whose 
physical assets are attacked creates broader jurisdictional opportunities. 
Regardless of the interpretative decisions, they must be logically 
compatible. An interpretation that disregards the physical routing of cyber 
attacks must also disregard the physical location of the servers hosting the 
victim State’s cyber assets. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶75 The threats posed by cyber attacks continue to expand with new 
technological developments. Cyber attacks display a new form of conflict, 
allow for aggression by non-State collective actors, demonstrate significant 
disaggregation of warfare, and challenge the traditional concepts of 
territory. In light of these sociological changes to warfare, the ASP should 
adjust the emerging definition of aggression to ensure its relevance to future 
conflicts. Global reliance on computer networks and the internet will only 
increase. As more States integrate their infrastructure, the ferocity of cyber 
warfare will escalate. The ICC should be equipped to dampen, if not punish, 
these attacks. 
¶76 This iBrief has the narrow purpose of demonstrating the necessity 
of making a definition of the crime of aggression sociologically relevant for 
the likely conflicts of the future. The ICC will be only a part of a solution to 
this new threat to international security. An intersecting web of 
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organizations and collaborative efforts will be necessary to fully address the 
issue. However, this iBrief’s analysis of the SWGCA’s proposed definition 
demonstrates an important lesson. The designers of international legal 
frameworks must consider emerging sociological forces when drafting their 
language. The sociological forces will significantly shape the environment 
in which the new institutions operate. Further, the implementers of those 
frameworks—the officers of the new institutions—must be given the 
flexibility to adapt them to the challenges of tomorrow. 
 
